Anil Seth’s research draws together psychology, philosophy, computer science and AI, physics, mathematics, psychiatry and neurology to determine the biological basis of conscious experience.
His research is guided by two ideas: that consciousness science is best pursued by attempting to account for properties of subjective experience in terms of neural mechanisms; and that basic experiences of conscious selfhood depend on close connections between brain and body. Seth’s lab develops and tests novel mathematical measures of information flow and neuronal complexity that serve as quantitative markers of conscious level, and investigates how conscious perception depends on the neural mechanisms that underly ‘predictive processing’ in the Bayesian brain. The lab also explores how prediction of bodily signals underlies basic experiences of selfhood, using novel combinations of virtual reality and psychophysiology. These insights are translated into new approaches to understanding disturbances of conscious experience in psychiatric disorders, from first-episode psychosis to Tourette syndrome.
President, British Science Association (psychology section), 2017
Editor-in- Chief, Neuroscience of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2014 to
Engagement Fellow, Wellcome Trust, 2016 to present
Steering group member, Human Mind Project, 2015 to present
Seth, A.K. “Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.” Cognitive Sciences 17, no. 11 (2013): 656–63.
Seth, A.K., and K.J. Friston. “Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences (2016).
Seth, Anil. 30-Second Brain. Icon Books, 2014
Seth, A.K., A.B. Barrett, and L.C. Barnett. “Granger causality analysis in neuroscience
and neuroimaging.” Journal of Neuroscience 35, no. 8 (2015): 3293–3297.
Bor, D. et al. “Adults can be trained to acquire synaesthetic experiences.” Scientific
Reports 4 (2014): 7089.
Seth, A.K. “A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the
puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synaesthesia.” Cognitive
Neuroscience (target article) 5, no. 2 (2014): 97–118.