Daniel Diermeier

IOG_DanielDiermeier

Appointment

  • Senior Fellow
  • Institutions, Organizations & Growth

Institution

  • University of Chicago
Harris School of Public Policy

Country

  • United States

Education

PhD (Political Science), University of Rochester
MA (Political Science), University of Rochester
MA (Political Science), University of Munich
MA (Philosophy), University of Southern California

About

Daniel Diermeier is a political scientist whose research focuses on formal political theory, political institutions, the interaction of business and politics, text analytics, public perception and crisis and reputation management.

His research into political institutions looks at how they can be designed for public benefit. His current research focuses on building formal models of ‘boundedly rational voters.’ Diermeier’s research fuels his international lectures and consultations on managing media and issues, activists and consumer boycotts, and political strategy and regulations. From 2014 to 2016 he was dean of the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He currently serves as the university’s 13th provost.

Awards

Fellow of the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 2014

Member, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2013

Kellogg Alumni Professor of the Year Award, 2013

Aspen Institute Faculty Pioneer Award, 2007

L.G. Lavengood Professor of the Year Award, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001

Relevant Publications

Diermeier, D., and P. Fong. "Legislative bargaining with reconsideration." Q. J. Econ. 126, no. 2 (2011): 895–946.

BDiermeier, D. Reputation Rules: Strategies for Building Your Company’s Most Valuable Asset. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011.

Bendor, J. et al. A Behavioral Theory of Elections. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Diermeier, D., and D. Baron. "Strategic activism and non-market strategy.” J. Econ. Manag. Strateg. 16, no. 3 (2007): 599–634.

Diermeier, D. et al. "A political economy model of congressional careers." Am. Econ. Rev. 95, no. 1 (2005): 347–73.

Connect

Google Scholar